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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the stop and questioning of defendants based on

an articulable reasonable suspicion that defendants had committed
a crime?
2.

Was the two-piece VCR seized and admitted into

evidence particularly described in the search warrant?

-iv-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 20584

GERALD W. DEITMAN and
ALBERT D. LOZANO,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendants, Gerald W. Deitman and Albert D. Lozano,
were each charged with one count of burglary, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202 (1978)
(Addendum A), and one count of theft, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1978) (Addendum B).
Defendants were convicted of the charged crimes in a
non-jury trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah on
February 4, 1985.

Both defendants were sentenced to a prison

term of 0-5 years.

The judge stayed execution of the prison

terms and both defendants were placed on probation for 18 months
and fined (R. 69, 76) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 1, 1984 at approximately 2:30 a.m., Salt Lake
City Police Officers Morgan Sayes and Ken Schoney responded in
separate patrol cars to a burglar alarm at International Video,
40 East 1300 South in Salt Lake City (R. 162, 184-185, 202, 291).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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International Video is located in a business district with
limited residential housing (R. 197, 207). Upon arriving at the
scene, both officers observed a pickup truck with a camper shell
parked across the street from International Video (R. 185-86,
202, 205). Both officers observed an occupant in the truck turn
on the truck's headlights, start the truck and drive the truck
from the officers in a southbound direction (R. 187, 211).
Except for the truck, there were very few vehicles parked on
either side of 1300 South (R. 187, 197).
Officer Sayes then followed the truck to 1492 South
Edison, waited for defendants to exit the truck, asked defendants
for identification, and ran a warrant check.

He found

an

outstanding warrant for defendant Lozano; however, he did not
arrest him (R. 199). As part of the investigation of the
reported burglary, he questioned the defendants as to their past
activities that night, then left the defendants and returned to
International Video (R. 188-91).

Upon his return, he learned

from other police officers and the store owner that a burglary
had actually been committed and that a two-piece VCR had been
stolen (R. 162, 190, 203). Officers then obtained a serial
number from the store owner.
Soon thereafter, Officer Sayes returned to 1492 South
Edison accompanied by other officers including Bruce Smith (R.
191).

Officer Sayes shined his flashlight through a rear window

in defendant Deitmanfs camper, the same camper officers observed
leaving the vicinity of the reported burglary.

He "saw a corner

of something," but could not identify it (R. 195). Subsequently,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he knocked on defendant Lozano's door and both defendants agreed
to talk with the officers.

Deitman said the officers could look

in the truck but could not get into the truck (R. 294). Officer
Smith then shined his flashlight in the rear window of the camper
and saw a "black rectangular object with what appeared to be a
memory switch" (R. 295).
The defendants were then placed under arrest (R. 193,
204) and the truck, registered to defendant Deitman (R. 294), was
not searched at that time, but was taken to an impound lot (R.
299, 303). A search warrant was obtained the next day.

The

store owner gave police one serial number which was placed in the
search warrant.

The search warrant described the property to be

seized as "a two-piece RCA VCR Model VGP 170, serial number
202510058" (addendum C).

The serial number on the VCR (State's

Exhibit No. 5) was 2025H0058 (R306).

The owner did not inform

the police of the serial number on the other piece of the VCR,
State's Exhibit No. 6 (R. 306).
The truck was searched on May 2, 1984 (R. 299, 304) and
a two-piece RCA video recorder was found in the camper matching
the description of the one stolen from International Video.
Defendants were both charged with burglary and theft, third
degree felonies.

Judge Wilkinson admitted the VCR after

considering defendants' motion to suppress the evidence.
Thereafter, the defendants were found guilty of burglary and
theft.
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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
The brief stop and questioning of defendants was
justified by the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendants
had committed a burglary.

The facts as known to the officer,

viewed from an objective standard, supported the officer's
suspicion of criminal activity.
The two-piece VCR seized by the officers was described
with particularity in the search warrant and was properly
admitted at trial.

,
ARGUMENT v
POINT I

SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION EXISTED TO STOP
AND QUESTION DEFENDANTS BASED UPON A
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT A CRIME HAD
BEEN COMMITTED AND THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
AS A RESULT OF THE STOP WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
This Court recently expressed concern about the failure
of the parties to brief relevant state constitutional questions
in criminal cases, particularly in the area of search and
seizurer -S££ State v. Earl, 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1986); £i&i£
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring).

The State will first address the question of

whether the analysis of the officer's actions in this case should
differ under Art. I S 14 of the Utah Constitution from a fourth
amendment analysis even though the trial court's ruling assumes
that the analysis is the same as that applied under the Fourth
Amendment.
This Court has traditionally construed Art. I § 14 and
the Fourth Amendment, which textually are nearly identical, as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

providing the same scope of protection. S&& e.g. State v.
Criscola. 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); State V, Lopes,
552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976).

Recognizing, of course, that the Court

may be rethinking its past application of Art. I, S 14, it is the
State1s position that there is no good reason why, in this case,
the Court should construe the Utah constitutional provision more
narrowly than the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted so as to
characterize Office Sayes' action an illegal investigative
detention.
Because it is the State1s position that the analysis of
this case under Art. I § 14 should be the same as that under the
Fourth Amendment, the remainder of this argument does not
separately analyze the two constitutions but treats them as if
the same analysis applied to both.
Under both constitutional provisions, the initial stop
and questioning by Officer Sayes was justified by his reasonable
suspicion that a crime had been committed.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-

7-15 (1982) provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
A brief detention is warranted where the circumstances do not
constitute probable cause for arrest, however there is need for a
temporary detention to investigate and obtain more information
about possible criminal activity.
A brief stop of a suspicious individual,
in order to determine his identity or to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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maintain the status quo momentarily while
obtaining more information, may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to
the officer at the time.
^
Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The stop and questioning
is an "intermediate response" so that a police officer "who lacks
• . . probable cause to arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape."

Adams v.

Williams, .supra at 145. See also: State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d
269 r 508 P.2d 534 (1973).

Law enforcement officers must be able,

"in appropriate circumstances, and in an appropriate manner [to]
approach a person for purpose of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest," United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983),
When a police officer sees or hears conduct
which gives rise to a suspicion of crime,
he has not only the right but the duty to
make observations and investigations to
determine whether the law is being violated,
and if so, to take such measures as are
necessary in the enforcement of the law.

State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977), £eri. jfeaifidr
434 U.S. 971 (1977).

State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 105

(Utah 1980) .
Appellants contend the initial stop and questioning by
Officer Sayes was unjustified since no probable cause existed.
However, the law is established that an officer need not have
probable cause to make an initial stop but only reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.

Adams v» Williams, supra; United

States v. Place, supra; State v. Whittenback. supra.

Further, an

officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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long as the citizen is not detained against his will.l

United

States v, Merritt. 936 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984); Florida V.
RQX£JL, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
The following facts, viewed objectively, justified the
initial stop of defendants:

(1) officers responded to a burglar

alarm at approximately 2:30 a.m. (R. 161-162, 184-185, 202, 291);
(2) at the time of the officers' arrival Defendant Deitman's
camper pickup truck was parked across the street from the
reported burglary (R. 185-186, 202, 205); (3) immediately upon
the arrival of the officers at the reported burglary the officers
observed defendants turn on the headlights, start the truck and
drive south from the reported burglary (R. 197, 207); (4) the
area of the reported burglary is a business district with minimal
traffic at 2:30 a.m. (R. 187, 197); (5) few cars were parked in
the immediate vicinity of International Video other than
Deitman's truck (R. 187, 211). Based on the facts Officer Sayes
1 Police encounters with the public can be divided into three
separate levels:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime (sic) and pose questions so long as the
citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion"
that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the "detention
must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a
suspect if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed
or is being committed. See Florida v. Royer.
460 U.S. 491, 498-499, 103 S.Ct. 1319,
1324-25, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236-37 (1983).
United States v. Mgrritt, 936 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

had reason to suspect defendants were involved in criminal
activity.

These facts should be considered in the light in which
i

they appeared to the officer at the time of the stop when
determining whether the officer was justified under the
circumstances.

These facts together with rational inferences,

reasonably supported a temporary detention to investigate
defendants' actions.

The defendants' timing of departure,

compounded by the time of night, the location of the burglary in
a business district, and the scarcity of traffic or parked cars
was sufficient to justify a fair-minded person's inquiry into the
circumstances of the defendants' actions.
Initially, Officer Sayes approached defendants and
posed questions as part of the investigation of the alarm, prior
to learning a burglary had been committed, however, this initial
encounter was not a detention against defendants' will (R. 188191) and as such did not constitute a seizure.
v, Merritt, supra at 230.

See United States

Further, an officer need not know that

a crime has occurred and that defendants are guilty; he need only
reasonably suspect that one has occurred or is occurring and that
defendants are involved in its occurrence, Utah Code Ann. § 77-715 (1982).

Therefore, although the officer may not have had

probable cause to arrest defendants at the time he stopped them
initially for questioning, the officer did have reasonable
suspicion to stop defendants and inquire about the activity in
which they were engaged.

Further, the officer had justification

to question defendants to determine if they observed anything
which could make them possible witnesses of criminal activity.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Defendants cite two cases wherein evidence was
suppressed because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop and question the defendants, however these cases are
distinguishable from the instant case.
In State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) , a
residence was burglarized at approximately 10:30 p.m.

Upon

learning of the burglary, an officer who had earlier seen two men
walking near the burglarized residence radioed their description
to the police dispatcher.

Other officers stopped the defendant

at approximately 1:30 a.m. based upon information received over
the radio.

In the subsequent pat-down search of the pair,

officers discovered some of the stolen property from the
burglarized residence.

This court found that the arresting

officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and his
companion because no evidence existed that defendants had been at
the scene of the crime.

The stop was based solely on a

description by a fellow officer who had observed the two walking
along the street at a late hour in an area where recent
burglaries had been reported.
In the instant case officers responded to a burglar
alarm at approximately 2:30 a.m. and observed defendants across
the street leave in a truck.

The burglarized store was in a

business district where traffic is minimal, at best, at 2:30 a.m.
and few automobiles were parked in the vicinity.

The questioning

of defendants by the officer was justified by the fact that the
officer had just observed defendants leave the immediate vicinity
of the reported burglary.

The officer had a duty to determine if

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendants had observed any criminal activity or if defendants
were in fact involved in any criminal activity.

In contrast, the

officers in Swanigan who stopped the defendant had neither
observed nor had knowledge that defendant had been at the scene
of the crime, Swanigan, supra at 719.
In State v. Carpena. 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1968),
this Court held that officers did not have reasonable suspicion
to stop defendants who were driving slowly in a car with out-ofstate license plates in a residential area late at night.

The

officers had not observed any criminal activity nor had any been
reported.

The facts as presented did not give the officers a

reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in any criminal
activity.
In Carpena. the officer had no objective facts on which
to base a reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in
criminal activity whereas in the instant case the officer had
just responded to a burglar alarm at 2:30 a.m. and observed
defendants leave the immediate vicinity of the reported burglary.
Based upon the facts, viewed objectively, the officer not only ,
had the right but the duty to question defendants, .State V»
ZolUfiLSf supra at 1127.
As the facts indicate in the instant case, the police
officer's reasonable suspicion of defendant's actions in
satisfaction of Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) were justified.
Therefore, the trial court's finding of probable cause to
effectuate a stop and questioning must be upheld.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE TWO-PIECE VCR (STATE'S EXHIBITS
5 AND 6) WAS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED
IN THE SEARCH WARRANT AND WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
Defendants claim their rights were prejudiced because
the search warrant contained only one of the two serial numbers
on the two-piece VCR.

Further, the one serial number given in

the search warrant contained a misplaced number.

This Court has

declined to rule on issues raised by defendants when they fail to
support their argument by any legal analysis or authority. .£££.
State v, Amiconef 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).

Defendants

offer no legal authority or analysis to support a claim of a
prejudicial search warrant.

In fact, defendants admit that the

discrepancy in the serial numbers is not, by itself, adequate to
show that the two-piece VCR is "inherently unidentifiable."
Therefore, this argument should be dismissed for lack of legal
substantiation.
Assuming defendants had supported their argument with
legal analysis the two-piece VCR was particularly described in
the search warrant and properly admitted at trial.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3 (1982), as amended, states in
part:
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation particularly describing the person
or place to be searched and the person,
property or evidence to be seized.
(emphasis
added).
A search warrant must enable the police officer to reasonably
ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be
seized.

Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1925).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The danger this Court perceives and that Utah Code Ann.
S 77-23-3 (1982) attempts to avoid is general warrants whereby
police officers are given licenses to explore or rummage at their
discretion through an individual's belongings looking for
evidence.

This Court recently dealt with such a case in which

the search warrant ordered seizure of "all controlled substances
and stolen property. * State v. Gallegos. 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,
24 (1985).

In pallegos this court held it was unacceptable for a

police officer to conduct an off-premises investigation to
establish probable cause to seize property (a VCR) not designated
in the search warrant.
This Court does not favor invalidating search warrants
because of minor technical deficiencies in the warrant's
description.

State V. Anderson, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 48 (1985).

In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity
once exacted under common law pleadings have
no proper place in this area. A grudging or
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward
warrants will tend to discourage police officers
from submitting their evidence to a judicial
officer before acting.
Furthermore, in evaluating the particularity requirement of
warrants, courts must avoid hypertechnical approaches, United
States V. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753 (3rd Cir. 1982), by
following "the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all
constitutional requirements, that are practical and not
abstract."

United States v. Ventresca, jsupid at 108. The

inclusion of a slightly erroneous numerical series does not give
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rise to a discretionary determination on the part of the
executing officer.

United States v. Rytman, 475 F.2d 192 (5th

Cir. 1973).
In the instant case the search warrant described with
particularity the item to be seized.

It properly described the

item to be seized as "a two-piece RCA VCR model VGP 170, serial
#202510058" (Addendum C ) .

The serial number in the warrant

matches exactly State's Exhibit No. 5 with the exception of one
misplaced number (Addendum C ) .

The serial number on the VCR was

2025H0058 (R. 306). Thus, eight of the nine numbers match
correctly.

Even though the serial number for State's Exhibit No.

6 was not in the search warrant, an adequate description of the
VCR already existed so Officer Smith could reasonably ascertain
the items to be seized.

Since the particularity of a description

in a warrant "varies with the circumstances and with the nature
of the property to be seized, " State v. Gallegos, .sii^ia, at 24
(citations omitted), the trial court correctly determined that
both serial numbers in their complete form were not necessary for
a particularized description.

The defendants offer no evidence

that the search warrant in the present case sanctioned a general
exploratory search of defendant's camper.
Since the trial court found ample particularization in
the search warrant, and since the defendants offer no legal
substantiation to show otherwise, the respondents respectfully
request that this Court affirm the judgment and conviction.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
Since Officer Sayes had a reasonable suspicion that
defendants had been involved in criminal activity and since the
search warrant particularly described the stolen two-piece VCR,
the trial court's decision to dismiss the motion by defendants to
suppress the evidence was correct.

Respondent seeks affirmation

of the verdict and judgment of the lower court.
DATED this<2JL day of Mayf 1986.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

^t£j^
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A
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76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
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76-6412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i)
The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft;
or
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another.
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not
more than $1,000; or
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or
•ervices valued at $250 or less; or
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow,
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry.
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
more than $100 but does not exceed $250.
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was
$100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subsection
(1), of section 76-6-408 may bring an action against any person mentioned
in (d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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I ..•

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
y

SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

m&•L.

To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
Bruoe L» Smith - SLCPD • * am satisfied that there is probable cause to beli
That

( ) on the person (s) of
(>j in the vehicle(s) described as 1965 Ford Pick-Up, F-10, white
PPlori Utah License #Ifl5Q94
( ) on the premises known as

In the City of
Salt Lake
, County of
Salt Lake
State of Utah, there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or
evidence described as:
A

2-pieoe RCA VCR Model VGP 170, serial #202510058

which property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed.
( ) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense.
( ) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense,
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
( ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a person or
entity not a party to the illegal conduct and good cause beinc
shown that the seizure cannot be obtained by subpoena without
the evidence being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered.
(Conditions for service of this warrant are included or attacl
hereto.)
You are therefore commanded:
(x) in the day time
( ) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown)
( ) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof
under oath being shown that the object of this search may
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result
to any person if notice were given)
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PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the
Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt
perty in your custody, subject to the oj
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

COURT
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COURT OF

IN THE

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT

«>•

Often

The personal property ( l i s t e d below/set out on the inventcjf^attached>
hereto) was taken from the premises located and described as

and from tbe^veSicle (s)^rffescribed as

^—•—

c/^ir^

and from the person (s) of

(pS

^

,0

pt^-d

fU

1

-/"V

f)

/^Aitro? /

ilUfJT-

by virtue of a search warrant dated the

^

day of

and executed by Judge
of the above-entitled court:

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
*SW - PageDigitized
1
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r<A [L/^t4\

» 19

tflltti/ J/HVUA

by whom this warrant
I.
was executed, do swear that the (above/attached) inventory contains a true and
detailed account of a l l the property taken by me under the warrant, on

2—

//^JifJ

19&U.
19 c

All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained
in »y custody subject to the order of this court of or any other court in
which the offense in respect to which the property or things taken, is triable

$AML<^w?^
Subscribed and sworn to before me

19

</H3 l/£t
gt^it

ik^

,t*

po^sh-oosB

JHS.

ro^

sixftGwn-

RSW - page 2
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0 \Gf
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

COURT

I!J AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS

County of Salt Lake )
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Eleanor S. Lewis
JUDGE

,

451 South 200 East
ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first du]y sworn, deposes and says:
That he/atex has reason to believe
That

( ) en the person (s) of ___
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as 1965 Tord Pickup F-1Q, white in color
Utah License 4LN 5094
( ) on the premises known as

In the City of
Salt Lake
, County of Salt Lake, State cf Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
a 2 - piece RCA VCR, Model VGP 170, Serial #202510058

and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
( ) has been used to coirjr.it or conceal a public offense;
( ) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense;
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists, .of-an^i^en or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by'p.'b^rson or entity not a party to the illegal
conduct.- [Xo't'e'requirements of Utah Code Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]
Affiant believes^te ptc^vrtV'in^^evidencc described above is evidence of the
crime(s) of Burglary'and Theft

03'Tn
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PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

/

^

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
On or about March 1, 1984 at 0103, a silent alarm sounded for International
Video within four (4) mintues officers Schovey and Sayes arrived at the
scene and observed the above described vehicle start up and leave. Officer Sayes
followed the vehicle to the residence of Mr. Lozano at 1492 Edison.
Scott Shiotani, cwner of the victim business identified the above described 2piece VCR as being stolen from his business on the night in question.
Your affiantf an experience police officer, was able to look thru the windew
of the vehicle and observed what appeared to be a 2-piece VCR.
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PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

Vour affiant considers the information received from the confidential informar
reliable because (if any information is obtained from an unnamed source)
K/A

Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential inform:
to be correct and accurate through the following independent investigation:

N/A
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PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure
of said items:
(X) in the day time.
( ) at any time day or night because there is reason to believe it
is necessary to seize the property prior to it being concealed,
destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons, to
wit:

It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing the requested
warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authority or purpose
because:
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice were given; or
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted.
This danger is believed to exist because:

U-^i L^:

/P

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME

IN AND FOR SALT
STATE OF UTAH
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